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I. INTRODUCTION
For sixty years, the federal common law D’Oench doctrine1 has
protected the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from the
costs and uncertainties of having to honor nonwritten agreements
made by banks prior to their failure.2 In its original form, the doctrine prevented banks and borrowers from making secret side agreements to their loans for the purpose of deceiving bank examiners like
the FDIC3 and provided the FDIC with an important tool with which

* Associate, Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., Miami, Florida. J.D. with Honors,
Florida State University College of Law, 2002. B.S.J., Northwestern University, 1997. Very
special thanks to my heroes, Larry Kellogg and Valerie Loth. This Comment was written
as part of the Ausley Scholars program through the generous support of DuBose Ausley.
1. From D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
2. See Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 967 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that the D’Oench
doctrine’s rationale is “to protect the FDIC from enforcement of oral agreements against
failed financial institutions”).
3. D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 457; see also Fred Galves, Might Does Not Make Right: The
Call for Reform of the Federal Government’s D’Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) Superpowers in Failed Bank Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1327-28 (1996) (describing
the common law D’Oench doctrine’s original scope).
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to protect the integrity of the country’s banking system.4 In 1950,
Congress included a provision in its Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(FDIA) that was analogous to, but did not abrogate, the common law
D’Oench doctrine.5 Together, the common law doctrine and its statutory counterpart, found at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), allowed the FDIC to
rely on the records of insolvent banks and to evaluate those banks’
assets and liabilities with greater accuracy.6 Working in tandem,7
they helped the FDIC boost the public’s confidence in the banking industry.8
The banking crisis that began in the 1980s, however, threw the
industry into turmoil and threatened to bankrupt the FDIC.9 In response, Congress and the courts expanded the scope of the statutory
and common law versions of the D’Oench doctrine and provided the
FDIC greater protection against defenses and affirmative claims
made by borrowers or creditors of insolvent banks.10 The protective
scope of the common law version of the D’Oench doctrine, in particular, extended beyond § 1823(e):11 in effect, the common law D’Oench
doctrine now bars the borrowers or creditors of failed banks from asserting any defense or affirmative claim without a written agreement, even in cases where the failed bank committed fraud or misrepresentation.12
Although the D’Oench doctrine’s expansion prevented the drainage of millions of dollars from the FDIC’s taxpayer-funded insurance
4. Michael Keeley & Toni Scott Reed, “Superpowers” of Federal Regulators: How the
Banking Crisis Created an Entire Genre of Bond Litigation, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 817, 85354 (1996).
5. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, ch. 967, § 2(13)(e)(1), 64 Stat.
889 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (2000)); see also John B. Shumadine, Comment, Striking a Balance: Statutory Displacement of Established Federal Common
Law and the D’Oench Doctrine in Murphy v. FDIC and Motorcity of Jacksonville Ltd. v.
Southeast Bank, 51 ME. L. REV. 129, 144 (1999) (recognizing that the FDIA did not displace the common law D’Oench doctrine).
6. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987).
7. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1326 n.7 (11th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (noting that courts employed §1823(e) and the common law D’Oench
doctrine in tandem).
8. The FDIC has helped create a stable, trustworthy banking system in the United
States; now, “a run on a bank has become an image from history.” Marsha Hymanson,
Note, Borrower Beware: D’Oench, Duhme and Section 1823 Overprotect the Insurer When
Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 253, 258 (1988).
9. Galves, supra note 3, at 1325-26, 1334 (stating that the decade from the mid1980s to mid-1990s saw 1,315 national bank failures, costing the government from $150
billion to $1 trillion, and that the FDIC exhausted its entire insurance fund by 1991).
10. Barry S. Zisman & Hugh D. Spears, Overview of Special Powers of the FDIC and
RTC, in BANKS AND THRIFTS: INTRODUCTION TO FDIC/RTC RECEIVERSHIP LAW 73, 75-76
(Warren L. Dennis & Barry S. Zisman eds., 1992).
11. See David F. D’Alessandris, Murphy v. FDIC: Is the D’Oench Doctrine Doomed?,
50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 3, 16 (1996) (suggesting that the common law D’Oench doctrine blocks claims that § 1823(e) does not).
12. Zisman & Spears, supra note 10, at 76-77.
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system, it has been criticized for creating some undeniably unfair results.13 Starting in 1995, perhaps in response to increasing cries of
unfairness, a number of circuit courts of appeals have ruled that
Congress preempted the common law D’Oench doctrine when it enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA).14 As a result, the FDIC’s ability to bar secret
side agreements has been significantly contracted in those circuits
because it must now rely on § 1823(e)’s narrower protections.
Recently, in Murphy v. FDIC,15 the FDIC successfully defended
the common law D’Oench doctrine’s existence in the Eleventh Circuit, slowing the abrogation movement’s momentum. Recognizing a
classic circuit split,16 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.17 However, only days before oral arguments, the parties settled.18
The common law D’Oench doctrine’s fate remains undetermined,
and jurisdiction remains the key to success in the cases in which it is
invoked.19 Part II of this Comment introduces the common law and
statutory versions of the D’Oench doctrine, and Part III describes the
nature and extent of their expansion. Part IV describes Murphy,
which exemplifies the current circuit split because it was tried first
in the D.C. Circuit and then in the Eleventh Circuit, with contrary
outcomes. Part V argues that the Supreme Court will not resolve the
issue soon, if ever. For the doctrine to survive until that day, the
FDIC must retain D’Oench’s presence within as many circuits as possible. Part V also argues that, for policy reasons, the courts of appeals
should recognize the common law D’Oench doctrine.

13. E.g., Richard E. Flint, Why D’Oench, Duhme? An Economic, Legal, and Philosophical Critique of a Failed Bank Policy, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 465 (1992) (arguing that
D’Oench is unfair to debtors); Galves, supra note 3, at 1333 (arguing that the common law
D’Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) create inequities and should be scaled back).
14. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. The circuit courts of appeals that have held that FIRREA abrogated the common law D’Oench doctrine include the D.C., Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See infra notes 117-20.
15. 208 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2000).
16. The common law D’Oench doctrine still exists in the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits. See id.; Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180 (4th Cir. 1997).
17. Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000).
18. Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 849 (2001). The case was dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46.1, which applies to settlements.
19. Because of the circuit split, forum shopping may be frequent. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000), cert. dismissed, 121 S. Ct. 849 (2001) (No.
00-46). The FDIC can be sued in the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 3 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A)
(2000)). However, Atlanta and Charlotte, the two largest banking centers in the southern
United States, are located in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, which continue to recognize the common law D’Oench doctrine. Id. at 3 n.3.
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II. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW D’OENCH DOCTRINE AND ITS
STATUTORY COUNTERPART, § 1823(e)
A. The FDIC
As the United States languished in the Great Depression and
confidence in its banking industry lulled, Congress enacted the
Banking Act of 193320 to restore confidence in the country’s banking
industry.21 The Act created the FDIC, which regulates and insures
deposits in all federally chartered banks and in many state chartered
banks.22
The FDIC acts in two capacities. In its “corporate” capacity, the
FDIC acts as a deposit insurer.23 It can either pay the depositors of a
failed bank directly or transfer depositors’ money to other insured
banks.24 In its “receiver” capacity, the FDIC has broad authority to
merge part or all of the failed bank with a healthy bank, assume operations of the bank, or both.25 Purchase and assumption transactions are the FDIC’s most commonly used tool for handling failed
banks.26 In a typical purchase and assumption transaction, the FDIC,
in its receivership capacity, sells all of the failed bank’s acceptable
assets to a healthy bank, then sells the remaining unacceptable or
problematic assets to the FDIC in its corporate capacity.27 The
FDIC’s corporate side then tries to collect on those problematic assets
to protect the insurance fund’s coffers.28
B. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC29
Amidst the post-Depression atmosphere, the FDIC insured an Illinois bank, Belleville Bank & Trust Co.30 D’Oench, a securities
dealer based in St. Louis, sold Belleville bonds that later defaulted.31
To relieve Belleville from having past-due bonds on its books,
D’Oench agreed to borrow $5,000 from Belleville.32 In its receipts for

20. Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 12B(a), 48 Stat. 162, 168.
21. See Jeffrey R. Gleit, Note, The Reports of the Demise of the D’Oench Doctrine Have
Been Greatly Exaggerated: The Continuing Coexistence of the D’Oench Doctrine and Section
1823(e), 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 225, 226 (1999).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2000) (allowing the FDIC to regulate banks); id. § 1821(a) (allowing the FDIC to insure banks); JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING
LAW AND REGULATION 61 (1992).
23. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
30. Id. at 454.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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the demand notes, however, Belleville promised D’Oench that it
would never call in the loan.33 These dealings effectively swept the
worthless bonds from Belleville’s books and replaced them with a
credible asset: the loan.34
In 1938, Belleville Bank failed. The FDIC acquired D’Oench’s
$5,000 demand note as part of the collateral for a $1 million loan to
resuscitate the bank.35 The FDIC sued D’Oench for repayment of the
note, as well as for allegedly violating § 12B(s) of the Federal Reserve
Act (FRA), which levied fines for knowingly making misstatements to
the FDIC about the value of securities.36 D’Oench argued that the
note was executed without consideration and that Belleville orally
agreed never to bring suit for nonpayment.37 In response, the FDIC
argued that D’Oench violated the FRA by knowingly misrepresenting
its true purpose for borrowing from Belleville: to enhance the bank’s
balance sheet.38 These misrepresentations, the FDIC argued, estopped D’Oench from asserting any defenses.39
The Court held that D’Oench, Duhme & Co. could not use its oral
side agreement with Belleville Bank as a defense against the FDIC:
The test is whether the note was designed to deceive the creditors
or the public authority, or would tend to have that effect. It would
be sufficient in this type of case that the maker lent himself to a
scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority on which
respondent relied in insuring the bank was or was likely to be misled.40

Essentially, the Court created a new federal common law rule41
that prevented banks and borrowers from making secret side agree33. Id. Specifically, the note said: “This note is given with the understanding it will
not be called for payment. All interest payments to be repaid.” Id. D’Oench kept the loan
alive by making periodic interest payments. Id. at 454, 456.
34. Cherie Stephens Bock, Comment, Alive, But Not Quite Kicking: Circuit Split Illustrates the Progressive Deterioration of the D’Oench, Duhme Doctrine, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
945, 952 (1998).
35. D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 454.
36. Id. at 456-57. Interestingly, the main issue on appeal did not involve the loan.
Rather, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a dispute between the District
Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals over whether Illinois or Missouri choice of
law rules applied. Id. at 455-56. The Court quickly sidestepped the issue, holding that
D’Oench’s liability was a federal question thanks to the FDIC’s Federal Reserve Act claim.
Id. at 456. This distraction aside, Justice Douglas and the Court proceeded to create a federal common law doctrine that has survived for sixty years.
37. Id. at 456. D’Oench also argued that FDIC was not a holder in due course. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 460.
41. Ironically, only four years earlier the Supreme Court had announced “There is no
federal general common law.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In
D’Oench, Justice Frankfurter was aware of the Court’s previous pronouncement and argued for resolving the dispute between D’Oench and the FDIC using state law. D’Oench,
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ments to their loans for the purpose of deceiving bank examiners like
the FDIC.42 The Court cited a federal public policy under the FRA to
protect the FDIC from misrepresentations, intentional or not,43
regarding the types or amounts of securities or other assets listed in
the portfolios of insured banks.44 Over time, the common law D’Oench
doctrine has come to be seen as serving two principal public policies:
maintaining the public’s confidence in the banking system, especially
in times of crisis; and allowing the FDIC to quickly and accurately
determine a failed bank’s financial status and decide whether to liquidate the bank or sell its assets.45
C. Expansion of Common Law Doctrine
In the sixty years since D’Oench, the common law D’Oench doctrine has expanded to protect “virtually all claims and defenses
against [the FDIC’s] interests.”46 Prior to the 1980s, when the country’s banking industry experienced relative calm, courts rarely invoked the common law doctrine47 and usually only against fraudulent
borrowers.48 In the few instances when courts invoked the doctrine,
they stayed within the boundaries of the D’Oench Court’s original
holding.49 However, the 1980s saw an increase in bank failures during the savings and loan crisis.50 To protect the FDIC, courts began
increasing the D’Oench doctrine’s scope.51 Today, the common law
doctrine is much broader than the version crafted by the Supreme
Court in 1942.52
For example, some courts expanded the common law doctrine’s
scope to include open, non-secret side agreements.53 Also, in an expansion of the D’Oench doctrine that critics view as contrary to
315 U.S. at 463-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). However, Justice Jackson countered and
prevailed, saying “Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent.” Id. at 470 (Jackson, J., concurring).
42. Galves, supra note 3, at 1327-28.
43. D’Oench, 315 U.S. at 458-59. Also, the Court held that it is irrelevant whether the
misrepresentation deceives or specifically injures creditors like the FDIC. Id. at 459.
44. See id. at 457-58.
45. Galves, supra note 3, at 1346-47 (citing Oversight of the FDIC and the RTC’s Use
of D’Oench Duhme: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. & the D.C.
of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 141, 143 (1995) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings]).
46. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 5; see also Galves, supra note 3, at 1344-45.
47. Bock, supra note 34, at 958.
48. Galves, supra note 3, at 1348-49.
49. Bock, supra note 34, at 958.
50. Id.
51. Id.; Galves, supra note 3, at 1349.
52. Bock, supra note 34, at 958.
53. Galves, supra note 3, at 1349; see also, e.g., FDIC v. Merchant’s Nat’l Bank, 725
F.2d 634, 640 (11th Cir. 1984) (determining that bank examiners’ discovery of an unwritten agreement is irrelevant).
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D’Oench’s equitable origin, courts have allowed the FDIC to invoke
D’Oench in cases in which the failed bank defrauded the borrower.54
Courts have also been criticized for allowing the FDIC to bar claims
by the failed banks’ creditors and contractors.55
In its original form, the common law D’Oench doctrine applied to
the FDIC only in its corporate capacity.56 However, the courts have
broadened D’Oench to protect the FDIC in its role as a receiver.57 The
common law D’Oench doctrine has also broadened to include agreements made by borrowers and subsidiaries of failed banks;58 to protect the FDIC’s third-party assignees, transferees, and successors-ininterest;59 and to provide the FDIC with holder-in-due-course status
relating to fraud claims that stemmed from the FDIC’s purchase and
assumption transactions.60 Furthermore, courts extended the
D’Oench doctrine to protect the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), in both its corporate and receivership roles.61
Each time the courts expanded the common law D’Oench doctrine’s
scope, they invoked the D’Oench Court’s original policy rationale.62
D. D’Oench’s Statutory Analogue: 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
1. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950
Within the FDIA, Congress enacted a statutory provision paral-

54. Galves, supra note 3, at 1350 (citing FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34 (6th Cir.
1985), in which the borrower signed a blank note, but the bank inserted an amount five
times greater than the amount the borrower orally agreed to).
55. Id. These cases often involve fact patterns in which the FDIC declines to pay subcontractors, like roofers and janitors, who complete work on an asset of the failed bank. Id.
Perhaps recognizing these cases as public relations disasters, e.g., Peter A. Brown, Workers
Holding Bills Owed by Failed Banks Left Holding the Bag, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS
SERVICE, Weekend Release, May 7-8, 1994, the FDIC issued a policy statement instructing
its lawyers not to use D’Oench against vendors when clear evidence exists that the vendors
supplied the goods or services promised. FDIC Statement of Policy Regarding Federal
Common Law and Statutory Provisions Protecting FDIC, as Receiver or Corporate Liquidator, Against Unrecorded Agreements or Arrangements of a Depository Institution Prior
to Receivership, 62 Fed. Reg. 5984, 5986 (Feb. 10, 1997).
56. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942).
57. E.g., FDIC v. First Nat’l Fin. Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1978).
58. Oliver v. Resolution Trust Corp., 955 F.2d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 1992).
59. Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 1992) (protecting successors-in-interest of the FDIC); Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir. 1990)
(protecting the FDIC’s bridge bank assignees); see also Barbara A. Bailey, Comment, Giving D’Oench its Due: A Comment on the D’Oench, Duhme Doctrine After O’Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1259, 1264-65 (1996) (describing judicial expansion of the
common law D’Oench doctrine).
60. Galves, supra note 3, at 1351-52.
61. FSLIC v. Kearney Trust Co., 151 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1945); see also D’Alessandris,
supra note 11, at 6 (discussing the expansion of the D’Oench doctrine to the FSLIC).
62. Gleit, supra note 21, at 232.
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leling the D’Oench doctrine.63 Section 13(e),64 codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1823(e),65 disavowed any agreement by a bank and its borrowers that
affected assets acquired by the FDIC, unless that agreement was in
writing;66 contemporaneous;67 approved by the bank’s management;68
and officially recorded by the bank.69 Like the common law D’Oench
doctrine, § 1823(e) allowed the FDIC, in its corporate capacity, to rely
on a failed bank’s records without concern for possible secret side
agreements with borrowers or clients.70 In 1987, the Supreme Court
found that the purposes behind § 1823(e) reflected those espoused in
the original D’Oench case.71
Importantly, however, the Act’s legislative history does not expressly address whether Congress meant to codify and abrogate the
common law D’Oench doctrine or simply supplement it.72 Nothing in
the FDIA’s legislative history implies that Congress intended to abrogate D’Oench.73 In fact, Congress never even mentioned the
D’Oench doctrine.74 Furthermore, the FDIC never indicated to Con63. Bock, supra note 34, at 954 (stating that § 1823(e) echoed the common law
D’Oench doctrine); Gleit, supra note 21, at 231 (characterizing § 1823(e) as an “adjunct” to
the common law doctrine).
64. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, ch. 967, § 2(13)(e), 64 Stat. 889
(1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (2000)).
65. As enacted in 1950, § 1823(e) read:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of
the Corporation in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security
for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such
agreement (1) shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and
the person or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall
have been approved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee,
which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and
(4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record
of the bank.
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) (2000)).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)(A).
67. Id. § 1823(e)(1)(B).
68. Id. § 1823(e)(1)(C).
69. Id. § 1823(e)(1)(D).
70. Bock, supra note 34, at 954-55.
71. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987). The Court found that § 1823(e) allowed the
FDIC to rely on failed banks’ records and scrutinize unusual transactions. Id. at 91-93.
72. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 8.
73. Galves, supra note 3, at 1354.
74. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 277. The language that would become § 1823(e) was
contemplated just once in testimony before the House, and then only briefly. Amendments
to Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 1950: Hearings on S. 2822 Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 81st Cong. 41-42 (1950) (statement of John F. Bovenzi, Director of
FDIC’s Division of Depositor & Asset Services).
Furthermore, when 13(e) was added to the FDIA, only one amendment was proposed,
changing the language in 13(e) to make it clear that the statute and the common law
D’Oench doctrine would not give the FDIC greater rights than banks. 96 CONG. REC.
10731-32 (1950). Congress ignored the amendment. Id. at 10770.
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gress that it thought § 1823(e) was needed to cure any perceived
faultiness or ineffectiveness within the D’Oench doctrine.75 But once
Congress enacted § 1823(e), the FDIC used it in tandem with the
common law doctrine in litigation.76 Section 1823(e) arguably “was an
afterthought to a complex bill and one which received virtually no
public debate or congressional analysis.”77 As such, it should be construed narrowly.78
2. Congress Expands § 1823(e): FIRREA
In the 1980s, the United States became embroiled in another
banking crisis as record numbers of banks became insolvent.79 To
help the FDIC cope with these failed banks and restore public confidence in the savings and loan industry, Congress enacted a number
of laws,80 including the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982,81 and then the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),82 which abolished the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and put the deposit insurance functions of savings and loans and savings banks in
the FDIC’s hands.83 FIRREA expanded the scope of § 1823(e) and increased the FDIC’s protection against claims arising from oral, noncontemporaneous, unapproved, and unofficial agreements between
failed banks and borrowers.84
Before 1989, the common law D’Oench doctrine was significantly
broader and more protective of the FDIC than its statutory counterpart, § 1823(e). Congress’s enactment of FIRREA narrowed this gap.
The statute reads:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of
the Corporation in any asset acquired by it under this section or
section 1821 of this title, either as security for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be
valid against the Corporation unless such agreement—
(A) is in writing,
75. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 276.
76. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 8.
77. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 279.
78. Id. at 279-80.
79. Id. at 258-59.
80. See DiVall Insured Income Fund P’ship v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank, 69 F.3d
1398, 1401 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress enacted FIRREA in response to the
country’s banking and savings and loan crises).
81. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469. The legislative history of the Garn-St. Germain
Act shows Congress’s intent to make it easier for the FDIC to arrange bailouts as well as
purchase and assumption agreements. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 281.
82. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217(4), 103 Stat. 183, 256 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823 (2000)).
83. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 4.
84. Gleit, supra note 21, at 233.
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(B) was executed by the depository institution and any person
claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor,
contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institution,
(C) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in
the minutes of said board or committee, and
(D) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the depository institution.85

Among its new protections, FIRREA applied § 1823(e) to the
FDIC in its role as receiver.86 Also, the Act protected bridge banks
and new banks created by the FDIC to deal with institutions in default.87 Perhaps most importantly, FIRREA created § 1821(d)(9)(A),
which protected the FDIC from affirmative claims—including misrepresentation—arising out of any agreement not in compliance with
§ 1823(e).88 Furthermore, FIRREA applied § 1823(e) to defenses
raised against the FSLIC’s successor, the Resolution Trust Company
(RTC), in both its corporate and receivership capacities.89 Much like
the legislative history of § 1823(e)’s first incarnation in 1950,
FIRREA’s legislative history included “no significant debate” about
the changes made to § 1823(e).90
III. COMPARISON OF SCOPE
A. The Common Law D’Oench Doctrine Provides Broader Protection
Than § 1823(e)
The common law D’Oench doctrine and its statutory analogue, §
1823(e), each provide the FDIC with protection from unwritten
agreements made by the failed banks it deals with. However, the
common law D’Oench doctrine has always provided broader protection than § 1823(e).91 When Congress passed the FDIA in 1950, the
Act protected only the FDIC.92 In contrast, by 1945 the Supreme
Court had already expanded the common law D’Oench doctrine to
protect the FSLIC.93 As time passed, the common law doctrine grew

85. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (2000).
86. Act of Aug. 19, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 201, 217, 103 Stat. 187, 256.
87. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4)(I).
88. Id. § 1821(d)(9)(A). Essentially, § 1821(d)(9)(A) codified case law which allowed the
FDIC to use the common law D’Oench doctrine to bar affirmative claims. E.g., Langley v.
FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
89. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A). FIRREA abolished the FSLIC and replaced it with the
RTC. Gleit, supra note 21, at 233 n.76.
90. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 9.
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id.
93. See FSLIC v. Kearney Trust Co., 151 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1945).

2002]

D’OENCH LIVES

177

even broader.94 Despite FIRREA’s broadening of § 1823(e) in 1989,
the common law D’Oench doctrine still provides broader protection to
the FDIC than does FIRREA § 1823(e),95 acting as a “safety net . . . to
cover situations which fall through the cracks” of § 1823(e).96 For example, § 1823(e) bars defenses based on an unwritten agreement related to specific assets acquired or assumed by the FDIC.97 Thus, §
1823(e) does not protect liabilities acquired or assumed by the FDIC.
In those frequent cases involving liabilities, however, courts have
used the common law D’Oench doctrine to rescue the FDIC and bar
borrowers’ claims.98 The common law D’Oench doctrine also provides
the FDIC with other protections not covered by § 1823(e),99 including
protection of third parties involved in purchase and assumption
agreements with the FDIC;100 protection of assignees and successorsin-interest of the FDIC;101 and protection of failed banks’ subsidiaries.102
Generally, however, “it is very difficult to decide where the statute ends and D’Oench begins.”103 But courts, attempting to effectuate
the legislative purpose of § 1823(e), continue to apply the common
law D’Oench doctrine in cases not covered by § 1823(e).104 As a result,
the common law D’Oench doctrine gradually has been expanded into
a federal holder-in-due-course doctrine.105 Its breadth and flexibility
“almost always allow[s] the FDIC to prevail when it is asserted.”106
94. See supra Part II.C.
95. DiVall Insured Income Fund P’ship v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank, 69 F.3d 1398,
1401 (1995) (“The common law D’Oench Duhme doctrine is roughly analogous to . . . [ §
1823(e)] but does provide the FDIC with broader protections in certain instances.”); see
also Bailey, supra note 59, at 1264 (noting numerous cases where the D’Oench doctrine
provides “broader protection” than § 1823(e)); Gleit, supra note 21, at 232 (arguing that
courts have applied D’Oench in situations not covered by § 1823).
96. In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1466 (D.D.C. 1992).
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1) (2000).
98. See Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 495 (9th Cir. 1995); Inn at Saratoga
Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1995); John v. RTC, 39 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.
1994); see also Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1188-89 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating in dicta that
the common law D’Oench doctrine overcomes § 1823(e)’s “specific assets” limitation); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.3d 592, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the
common law D’Oench doctrine overcomes § 1823(e)’s “specific asset” limitation).
99. Bailey, supra note 59, at 1265.
100. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 11 F.3d 1260, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1994).
101. Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 1992) (protecting successors-in-interest of the FDIC); Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir. 1990)
(protecting the FDIC’s bridge bank assignees).
102. Oliver v. Resolution Trust Corp., 955 F.2d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 1992).
103. Warren L. Dennis, The O’Melveny Decision: End of an Era, 514 PRACTISING LAW
INST./LITIG. 109, 126 (1994) (quoting In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig., 826 F. Supp.
1448, 1457 (D.D.C. 1992)).
104. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
105. Rankin v. Toberoff, No. 95-CIV. 10995(AGS), 1998 WL 370305, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
June 30, 1998); see also D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 6.
106. Gleit, supra note 21, at 235.
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For this reason, the FDIC continues to fight the growing circuit court
schism.
B. The FDIC’s 1997 Policy Statement
In 1997, the FDIC issued a policy statement directing its attorneys to curtail their use of the common law D’Oench doctrine in all
cases originating after the enactment of FIRREA in 1989.107 In the
policy statement, the FDIC included guidelines describing seven
situations in which FDIC attorneys might need approval from FDIC
headquarters in Washington, D.C., before asserting the D’Oench doctrine.108 Wanting to protect the core of the common law doctrine from
judicial attack, the FDIC delivered a policy aimed at tempering unfair results in some cases:109
Although the D’Oench doctrine and the statutory provisions generally promote essential public policy goals, overly aggressive application of the specific requirement of these legal doctrines could
lead to inequitable and inconsistent results in particular cases. In
order to ameliorate this possibility, the FDIC has undertaken development of these guidelines and procedures to promote the exercise of sound discretion in the application of D’Oench or the statutory provisions.110

But in its practical effects, the policy statement really only scales
back D’Oench’s use in cases of obvious unfairness. Washington has
complete discretionary authority over cases involving close questions
similar to Murphy.111 In fact, the FDIC has continued to invoke the
common law D’Oench doctrine even after issuing the statement.112
Furthermore, the FDIC’s policy statement does not affect the ability
of bridge banks, transferees, or assignees to invoke the common law
D’Oench doctrine. Despite its policy statement, the FDIC continues to

107. FDIC Statement of Policy Regarding Federal Common Law and Statutory Provisions Protecting FDIC, as Receiver or Corporate Liquidator, Against Unrecorded Agreements or Arrangements of a Depository Institution Prior to Receivership, 62 Fed. Reg.
5984, 5985 (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter FDIC Policy Statement].
108. These types of cases included cases involving pre-closing vendors, id. at 5986; diligent parties, id.; documents indicating a borrower’s claim, id. at 5987; transactions not recorded within the ordinary course of business, id.; bilateral obligations, id.; statutory defenses, id. at 5987-88; and cases involving § 1823(e)’s contemporaneous requirement, id. at
5988.
109. The FDIC most likely issued the statement in response to the D.C. Circuit’s 1995
decision in Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in which it held that FIRREA
preempted the common law D’Oench doctrine.
110. FDIC Policy Statement, supra note 107, at 5986.
111. Id. at 5984.
112. See, e.g., FDIC v. Noel, 177 F.3d 911, 917-18 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 935 (2000); Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1187-89 (4th Cir. 1997); FDIC v. Frates, 44
F. Supp. 2d. 1176, 1220-21 (N.D. Okla. 1999).
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use the common law D’Oench doctrine because its scope exceeds the
scope of § 1823(e).
IV. MURPHY AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
For years, the common law D’Oench doctrine and its statutory
counterpart, § 1823(e) of the FDIC Act, provided the FDIC with an
almost unbeatable legal tool that acted both as a weapon and a
shield.113 But in 1995, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia made D’Oench vulnerable in Murphy v. FDIC.114 Relying on a
1994 Supreme Court case, O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,115 which held
that the judiciary could not create new federal common law that alters congressional legislation,116 the D.C. Circuit held that FIRREA
preempted the common law D’Oench doctrine.117 Subsequently, the
Eighth,118 Ninth,119 and Third120 Circuits have issued similar holdings. Suddenly, the FDIC found one of its most effective litigation
tools in jeopardy. However, after the D.C. Circuit remanded Murphy
v. FDIC, the case was moved to the Eleventh Circuit, which upheld
the common law D’Oench doctrine within its jurisdiction.121
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1989, Bruce Murphy received a letter from a Florida developer,
Orchid Island Associates Limited Partnership (Orchid), inviting Murphy to invest in a golf and beach club development.122 The letter
included a statement by Arthur Andersen & Co. that projected a “6.1
multiple return on . . . investment.”123 Emboldened, Murphy invested
more than $515,000 for a stake in the Orchid partnership.124 The project’s construction lender, Southeast Bank, loaned Orchid more than
$50 million; however, Orchid defaulted.125 A short time later, Southeast Bank failed and went into FDIC receivership.126
In August 1992, Murphy sued the FDIC in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.127 Murphy alleged that
113. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 5; see also Galves, supra note 3, at II.A.
114. 61 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
115. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
116. Id. at 87.
117. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 35.
118. See DiVall Ins. Income Fund Ltd. v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank, 69 F.3d 1398
(8th Cir. 1995).
119. See RTC v. Kennelly, 57 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1995).
120. See FDIC v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2000).
121. Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2000).
122. Id. at 961.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.

180

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:167

Southeast’s involvement in the development went beyond that of a
construction lender and rose to the level of “joint venturer or partner.”128 Seeking damages and an order forcing the FDIC to release
pertinent accounting statements, Murphy argued that Southeast
caused the investment to fail.129 He sued for breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, accounting improprieties, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and failure to register securities.130
The FDIC countered with the D’Oench doctrine, arguing that
Murphy could not point to any written document stating that Southeast was a joint venturer or partner in the development.131 The FDIC
moved to dismiss Murphy’s claim under the common law D’Oench
doctrine.132 The district court treated the FDIC’s motion as a motion
for summary judgment and dismissed Murphy’s complaint for failure
to state a claim.133
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Murphy
faced the daunting task of overcoming both § 1823(e) and the common law D’Oench doctrine. However, shortly before Murphy’s appeal,
the Supreme Court released its O’Melveny opinion. Murphy seized on
the Court’s decision, in which it held that it would not create federal
common law rules to supplement “comprehensive and detailed” federal statutes,134 to argue that FIRREA preempted the common law
D’Oench doctrine.135
B. The Supreme Court: O’Melveny and Atherton Threaten the
Common Law D’Oench Doctrine
In O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,136 the Supreme Court limited the
FDIC’s ability to use federal common law doctrine in the litigation of
failed banks.137 In that case, the FDIC sued a law firm that represented a savings and loan (S&L) which later fell into FDIC receivership.138 The FDIC alleged professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty under California law.139 Both claims arose out of the firm’s
alleged failure to tell the FDIC about illegal acts committed by the
128. Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 36.
130. Id. at 35-36. Murphy also complained that the FDIC failed to establish alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) procedures. Id. at 36. The D.C. Circuit rejected this cause of action because FIRREA’s ADR statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(7)(B)(iii) (2000), gave the FDIC
discretion to refer cases to ADR. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 40-41.
131. Id. at 36.
132. Id.
133. Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 961 (11th Cir. 2000).
134. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1994).
135. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 36.
136. 512 U.S. 79.
137. Bock, supra note 34, at 966.
138. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 81-82.
139. Id. at 82.
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S&L’s controlling officers.140 The law firm asserted a state-law-based
defense that imputed the officers’ actions to the FDIC through the
S&L.141 The FDIC asked the Supreme Court to create a federal common law rule to prevent such an imputation.142
However, the Court held unanimously that FIRREA preempted
the creation of federal common law regarding imputation.143 The controlling law, it stated, must be found either in the federal statute or
in state law.144 The Court held that, absent a significant conflict between a government interest or policy and the use of state law,145 it
would not create federal common law rules to supplement “comprehensive and detailed” federal statutes like FIRREA.146
For support, the Court cited § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i),147 a new provision
Congress added as part of FIRREA in 1989148 that the Court characterized as “plac[ing] the FDIC in the shoes of the insolvent S&L, to
work out its claims under state law, except where some provision in
the extensive framework of FIRREA provides otherwise.”149 The
Court found that Congress’s inclusion of new provisions like §
1821(d)(9),150 a D’Oench-like provision requiring all claims to satisfy §
1823(e), granted rights to the FDIC as receiver that cannot be augmented or changed by federal common law.151 Congress’s inclusion of
these provisions excluded the existence of other provisions, including
federal common law rules.152 The Court reasoned that to create common law exceptions above and beyond statutory exceptions does not
supplement the law, but “alter[s]” it.153
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 83.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 85.
145. Id. at 87.
146. Id. at 85.
147. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (providing that the FDIC “shall . . . by operation of law, succeed to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution”).
148. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 85-86.
149. Id. at 87. The Court limited the creation of federal common law only in those limited situations involving a “significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and
the use of state law.” Id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)).
150. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A). “[A]ny agreement which does not meet the requirements set forth in section 1823(e) of this title shall not form the basis of, or substantially
comprise, a claim against the receiver or the [FDIC].” Id.
151. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 86-87.
152. Id. The Court cited the legal adage “[i]nclusio unius, exclusio alterius,” id. at 87,
which means “to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999). The D.C. Circuit later seized upon this language in
Murphy v. FDIC as evidence that Congress purposely did not include the common law
D’Oench provisions in FIRREA, and that FIRREA preempted the D’Oench doctrine. Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See infra Part IV.C.
153. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87.
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In the view of some courts of appeals, the Court’s language in
O’Melveny—and its 1997 decision in Atherton v. FDIC,154 which echoed O’Melveny—signaled the end of the common law D’Oench doctrine in its broad form.155 In those circuits, the common law D’Oench
doctrine no longer shields the FDIC beyond the protections provided
in § 1823(e).
C. Murphy in the D.C. Circuit
O’Melveny provided Bruce Murphy with a stronger argument on
appeal. Embracing it, Murphy argued that FIRREA preempted the
common law D’Oench doctrine.156 The FDIC countered, arguing that
the Supreme Court in O’Melveny never explicitly mentioned the
D’Oench doctrine and therefore did not alter its validity.157 The D.C.
Circuit rejected this argument, citing a rule that favors implementing Supreme Court rulings generally rather than to a limited set of
facts.158 The court also noted that both parties’ briefs in O’Melveny
advised the Supreme Court that its decision could affect the common
law D’Oench doctrine.159 Finally, the FDIC argued that although
O’Melveny may have prohibited the judicial creation of new federal
common law, it did not prohibit the application of a more than 50year-old doctrine.160 But the D.C. Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that once Congress addresses an issue, the federal courts’
“unusual exercise” of creating common law disappears and succumbs
to the courts’ “commitment to the separation of powers.”161
Murphy argued, and the D.C. Circuit agreed, that Congress’s inclusion of § 1821(d)(9),162 the D’Oench-like provision cited by the
O’Melveny Court requiring that all claims satisfy § 1823(e),163 “implies the exclusion of overlapping federal common law defenses not
specifically mentioned in the statute—of which the D’Oench doctrine
is one.”164 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit found that the O’Melveny
Court’s statement that
“§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) places the FDIC in the shoes of the insolvent S
& L . . .” [indicated that the Court] appears to have concluded that
154. 519 U.S. 213 (1997). In Atherton, the Court applied O’Melveny’s holding that
“cases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified . . . are . . . ‘few
and restricted.’” Id. at 218 (citing O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87).
155. E.g., Murphy, 61 F.3d at 34.
156. Id. at 36.
157. Id. at 39.
158. Id. (citing Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
159. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 39.
160. Id. at 40.
161. Id. (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1981)).
162. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) (2000).
163. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1994).
164. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 39.
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the Congress in the FIRREA did indeed address the question previously governed by D’Oench. It follows that the need for a body of
federal common law under the rubric of D’Oench has now “disappeared” . . . .165

The Court held that FIRREA preempted D’Oench and remanded to
the district court.166
The D.C. Circuit also examined whether § 1823(e) barred Murphy’s claims.167 Citing its 1994 holding in E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. FDIC,168 the court characterized the statute as barring “anyone
from asserting against the FDIC any agreement not properly recorded in the records of the bank that would diminish the value of an
asset held by the FDIC.”169 However, the court limited § 1823(e) to
cases involving specific assets arising from “conventional loan transactions.”170 Murphy embraced this language, arguing that unlike the
plaintiff in D’Oench, he was not a borrower attempting to shirk repayment of a conventional loan.171 Rather, Murphy argued he was
simply an investor—an investor in an investment gone sour because
of Southeast Bank’s ineptitude.172 The court, influenced by the
FDIC’s inability to identify any specific asset related to a conventional loan transaction, agreed with Murphy’s argument and held
that the statute’s asset requirement was not met.173 The court supported its decision by noting that agreements like the one between
Murphy and Southeast did not involve an extension of credit and
therefore did not require approval by Southeast’s board.174 Thus, it
was not the type of agreement contemplated by § 1823(e)(1)(C).175
As the first case to prohibit the FDIC’s use of the broad protections provided by the common law D’Oench doctrine, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Murphy v. FDIC did not go unnoticed.176 In effect, the

165. Id. at 40. (citation omitted).
166. Id. at 40-41.
167. Id. at 36.
168. 32 F.3d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
169. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 36 (citing du Pont, 32 F.3d at 596).
170. Id. at 37 (citing du Pont, 32 F.3d at 597) (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The court found unconvincing an argument implicit from a footnote in the
FDIC’s brief that the loans made by Southeast Bank to Orchid were specific assets that
may be diminished by Murphy’s claim. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 16 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling was correct); Michael B. Kent, Jr., The Court Giveth, and Congress Taketh Away:
Statutory Preemption and the Federal Common Law D’Oench Doctrine, 116 BANKING L.J.
214, 246 (1999) (same). Cf. Bock, supra note 34, at 978-80 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s
ruling was wrong).

184

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:167

ruling narrowed the common law D’Oench doctrine to its original
scope, rendering it useless in the D.C. Circuit.177
D. Murphy in the Eleventh Circuit
The D.C. Circuit effectively wrested away a doctrine that had become one of the FDIC’s most important weapons against borrowers’
defenses, as well as one of its most protective shields against borrowers’ affirmative claims. However, the FDIC refused to stand by and
watch courts eviscerate the 50-year-old doctrine.
On remand to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, the FDIC again moved for summary judgment.178 More
importantly, however, the FDIC asked that the case be transferred to
the Southern District of Florida,179 which, as part of the Eleventh
Circuit, provided the FDIC with a much friendlier environment. Previously, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had staunchly defended the D’Oench doctrine, holding that the D’Oench doctrine “applies in virtually all cases where a federal depository institution
regulatory agency is confronted with an agreement not documented
in the institution’s records.”180 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia concluded that Florida provided a “more
convenient location” for the case because Murphy, the majority of
witnesses, the development, and the now-defunct Southeast Bank
were located there.181 This more favorable location paid off quickly for
the FDIC.182 The district court substituted Jeffrey H. Beck183 as successor agent for the FDIC and granted the FDIC’s motion to dismiss,
holding that the federal common law D’Oench doctrine barred Murphy’s claim.184
177. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 11.
178. Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 962 (11th Cir. 2000).
179. Id.
180. OPS Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306, 308 (11th Cir. 1993); see also
Baumann v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991); FSLIC
v. Two Rivers Assocs., Inc., 880 F.2d 1267, 1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
D’Oench doctrine applies in FDIC’s receiver capacity).
After the D.C. Circuit’s Murphy decision in 1995 but before the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 2000, the Eleventh Circuit continued to uphold the common law D’Oench doctrine.
E.g., Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), vacated and remanded by Hess v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), reinstated by Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 120 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc),
cert. denied, Hess v. FDIC, 523 U.S. 1093 (1998).
181. Murphy, 208 F.3d at 962.
182. Murphy tried to transfer the case back to the D.C. Circuit, but was denied. In re
Murphy, No. 98-5475, 1998 WL 929816 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 1998).
183. Beck had been Southeast’s Chapter 7 trustee and was appointed successor agent
after the FDIC completed its receivership duties. Brief For Respondent at 2 n.1, Murphy v.
Beck, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000) (No. 00-46), cert. dismissed, 121 S. Ct. 849 (2001).
184. Murphy, 208 F.3d at 969. The district court offered two alternative grounds for its
decision. Id. at 962. First, Murphy could not claim that Southeast Bank owed him a duty
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Murphy appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which reviewed the
district court’s summary judgment de novo.185 Murphy made four different arguments as to why the D’Oench doctrine should not apply to
the case.186 First, in an attempt to regain the jurisdictional advantages of the D.C. Circuit, Murphy argued that the choice of law doctrine required the Eleventh Circuit to apply the D.C. Circuit’s laws,
not its own.187 Second, Murphy argued that the ruling by the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit should constitute the “law of the case.”188
Third, he argued that the D’Oench doctrine should not apply when a
monetary surplus has been amassed during FDIC receivership.189
Finally, Murphy argued that the Supreme Court’s recent rulings
in O’Melveny and Atherton invalidated the D’Oench doctrine.190 From
the outset of its opinion, however, the Eleventh Circuit positioned itself as a defender of the D’Oench doctrine. The court outlined the doctrine’s scope:
In a suit over the enforcement of an agreement originally executed
between an insured depository institution and a private party, a
private party may not enforce against a federal deposit insurer any
obligation not specifically memorialized in a written document
such that the agency would be aware of the obligation when conducting an examination of the institution’s records.191

as joint venturer with Orchid, because a written agreement made by Orchid and Southeast
Bank explicitly disclaimed the existence of any joint venture between the two parties. Id.
Also, even if Murphy was not a party to the written agreement between Orchid and Southeast Bank, he had failed to prove the existence of any joint venture. Id.
185. Id. at 962.
186. Id. at 963.
187. Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, choosing to follow the D.C., Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which had held that in cases involving federal issues,
transferee courts must follow their own interpretations of law. Id. at 964-66.
188. Id. at 963. The law-of-the-case doctrine provides: “[W]hen a court decides upon a
rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages
in the same case.” Id. at 966 (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)). However, courts have discretion to apply the law of the case doctrine, and the Eleventh Circuit
chose not to. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. at 618).
189. Id. at 963. Southeast’s receivership generated a $150 million surplus, which the
FDIC distributed to Southeast’s shareholders. Id. at 966-67. Murphy argued that those
shareholders should not benefit from his $500,000 loss. Id. at 967. The court rejected the
argument and stated that D’Oench’s rationale—to allow the FDIC to make quick and reliable evaluations of bank records—is not affected whether or not the failed bank generates
a surplus. Id.
190. Id. at 963.
191. Id. (citing Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1326
(11th Cir. 1996) (en banc) [Motorcity I], vacated and remanded by Hess v. FDIC, 519 U.S.
1087 (1997), reinstated by Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 120 F.3d 1140
(11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) [Motorcity II]; OPS Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306,
308 (11th Cir. 1993); Baumann v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1510
(11th Cir. 1991); FSLIC v. Two Rivers Assocs., Inc., 880 F.2d 1267, 1274, 1276-77 (11th
Cir. 1989)).
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Next, the court addressed the D.C. Circuit’s finding that Congress
preempted the common law D’Oench doctrine.192 The Eleventh Circuit cited previous cases in which it held that the doctrine applies “in
virtually all cases” involving an undocumented agreement.193 After
highlighting its fundamental disagreement with the D.C. Circuit, the
court addressed Murphy’s argument that the Supreme Court’s holding in O’Melveny, and also the Court’s recent Atherton decision,
worked to essentially kill the D’Oench doctrine.194 Citing previous
holdings, the Eleventh Circuit held that O’Melveny and Atherton involved the question of whether the judiciary can create new federal
common law doctrines to supplement particular statutes.195 The Supreme Court did not, the court explained, address the question of
whether Congress intended FIRREA to replace the D’Oench doctrine.196 The court argued that United States v. Texas,197 rather than
O’Melveny and Atherton, provided the applicable Supreme Court
holding.198 In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court stated the
“longstanding . . . principle that ‘[s]tatutes which invade the common
law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of
long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory
purpose . . . is evident.’”199 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held, Congress did not intend to abrogate the then nearly 50-year-old D’Oench
doctrine.200 The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Murphy’s claims, injecting one final, unequivocal statement: “[T]he
D’Oench, Duhme doctrine remains good law in this Circuit, and there
is no sound reason not to apply the doctrine in this case.”201
Shortly after the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, Murphy appealed to
the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.202 It appeared as
though the Court finally would resolve the circuit split over the
D’Oench doctrine’s existence. However, only five days before oral ar-

192. Murphy, 208 F.3d at 963.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 968-69.
195. Id. at 968 (citing Motorcity II, 120 F.3d at 1143, and Motorcity I, 83 F.3d at 1330).
196. Id. at 968-69.
197. 507 U.S. 529 (1993).
198. Murphy, 208 F.3d at 969.
199. Id. n.7 (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534 (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))).
200. Id. at 969. The court stated:
We continue to believe that the analysis set forth in our prior en banc opinion reflects the most reasonable reading of Congress’s intent—i.e., that Congress did
not intend FIRREA to displace the D’Oench doctrine, but rather intended to continue the harmonious, forty-year coexistence of the statute and the D’Oench doctrine.
Id.
201. Id.
202. Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 30 (2000).
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guments, Murphy and the FDIC settled their dispute, leaving the
question unanswered.203
V. THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW D’OENCH DOCTRINE
A. The Supreme Court
As exemplified in Murphy, the circuit courts of appeals remain
split over whether Congress preempted the common law D’Oench
doctrine.204 Barring the highly unlikely event that one view overcomes the other throughout the circuits, the Supreme Court must
unify the circuits.205 However, the Court probably will not resolve the
circuit split in the near future.
First, due to relative calm in the banking industry and the FDIC’s
1997 policy statement,206 in which it agreed to resist invoking the
common law D’Oench doctrine, the number of D’Oench cases litigated
will probably decrease.207 However, the FDIC policy statement is discretionary, and whether the FDIC will follow it strictly or loosely is
still uncertain.208
Perhaps most significantly, a D’Oench case will not likely get to
the Court soon because the FDIC has an incentive to settle those
cases before they reach the Court, as it did in Murphy. The FDIC’s
main objective may be to prevent the Court from completely wresting
away the common law D’Oench doctrine. Presently, a significant possibility exists that the Court would do this, for a number of reasons:
the O’Melveny and Atherton holdings, which say that legislation like
FIRREA preempts federal common law rules, are persuasive and
sensible;209 the common law D’Oench doctrine, acting as a de facto
statute of frauds, produces unfair results in some cases;210 and §
1823(e) may provide the FDIC with adequate protection, while the
common law D’Oench doctrine overprotects in the relatively calm
banking climate that currently exists.211 Also, the Court’s 1997 Hess
decision, which vacated and remanded the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc

203. Murphy v. Beck, 121 S. Ct. 849 (2001).
204. See also infra Part VI (noting that the D.C., Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
have held that Congress preempted the D’Oench doctrine, while the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits held the doctrine was not preempted).
205. See, e.g., Bock, supra note 34, at 984.
206. FDIC Policy Statement, supra note 107, at 5986.
207. But see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, Murphy v. Beck, 208 F.3d 959
(11th Cir. 2000) (arguing that the D’Oench doctrine continues to arise in litigation, even after the FDIC’s policy statement).
208. Id. at 15; see also Bock, supra note 34, at 986.
209. For instance, they persuaded the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits to adopt the
view that § 1823(e) abrogated the common law D’Oench doctrine. See supra Part IV.B.
210. See supra Part III.B, Part I, and note 13.
211. See D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 16.
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decision in Motorcity I212 and upheld the D’Oench doctrine with instructions to apply Atherton, provides telling evidence that the Court
may abolish the common law D’Oench doctrine.213
In all likelihood, the FDIC will settle in unfriendly jurisdictions,
including the D.C., Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, in order to
avoid court-imposed judgments. The FDIC will also settle in its
friendly jurisdictions, the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, to avoid continued appeals to the Supreme Court. The Court will not likely see a
D’Oench case again until the FDIC becomes confident that, due to
another banking crisis or a change of faces on the Court, the Court
will protect the FDIC by upholding the common law doctrine. For
now, however, the key to the doctrine’s survival involves keeping its
footing within as many circuits as possible.
B. Cost vs. Fairness
Undeniably, the common law D’Oench doctrine produces unfair
results in cases where the failed bank acted fraudulently or made
misrepresentations.214 For example, borrowers defrauded by a bank
officer’s oral misrepresentations cannot raise traditional contract defenses that overcome D’Oench.215 Commentators argue that D’Oench,
as an equitable doctrine,216 should not be used in those cases:217 “In
an era when, unfortunately, bank officers of failed banks often have
acted to the detriment of their borrowers (sometimes criminally so),
the borrowers, like the FDIC, deserve some protection.”218 The common law D’Oench doctrine’s protection may fail to discourage troubled banks from engaging in fraud or misrepresentation, although it
does not encourage those practices.
Commentators add that § 1823(e), unaided by the common law
D’Oench doctrine, provides the FDIC with adequate protection.219
Therefore, the added protection provided by the common law doctrine
is unnecessary.

212. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), vacated and remanded by Hess v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), reinstated by Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 120 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
213. Hess v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), reinstated by Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd.
v. Southeast Bank, 120 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
214. Galves, supra note 3, at 1328 (arguing that the D’Oench doctrine creates an “unfair windfall” to the FDIC).
215. J. Michael Echevarria, A Precedent Embalms a Principle: The Expansion of the
D’Oench, Duhme Doctrine, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 745, 803 (1994).
216. Galves, supra note 3, at 1347-48; Gleit, supra note 21, at 227.
217. See, e.g., Galves, supra note 3, at Part III (calling for reform of the D’Oench doctrine that would continue to protect the FDIC, except in certain cases where D’Oench
causes injustices to borrowers).
218. Hymanson, supra note 8, at 257.
219. D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 16.
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Although the common law D’Oench doctrine gives the FDIC protections that occasionally produce unfair results, the six circuits220
that have not directly decided D’Oench’s fate should uphold the doctrine because it provides monetary and efficiency benefits that outweigh the costs created by unfair outcomes. The D’Oench doctrine
has spared the FDIC from billions of dollars in claims made by borrowers alleging side agreements with failed banks.221 First, the common law doctrine provides the FDIC’s insurance fund broader protection than § 1823(e) does. Although this added protection becomes less
significant in a calm banking climate, the FDIC will need this added
protection in future banking crises.
Second, the common law D’Oench doctrine, as a de facto statute of
frauds, provides the FDIC with crucial efficiency benefits. When a financial institution fails, the FDIC must quickly and accurately determine the institution’s financial status.222 This important decision
includes whether to liquidate the institution’s assets or sell them
through purchase and assumption agreements.223 The accuracy of
these decisions affects the solvency of the insurance fund and the
public’s confidence in the FDIC: if the FDIC must liquidate the institution, public confidence in the banking industry will weaken.224
As a result, the FDIC prefers purchase and assumption agreements.225 Purchase and assumption agreements allow the FDIC to
sell the failed bank’s healthy assets to other banks, which then assume payments owed to the failed bank’s depositors.226 The FDIC, as
receiver, then sells the failed bank’s bad assets to the corporate arm
of the FDIC.227 With the money made on this sale, the FDIC/receiver
partially reimburses the banks that assumed the failed bank’s liabilities.228
Time is a major factor in the FDIC’s decision to liquidate or enter
into purchase and assumption agreements because the execution of
purchase and assumption agreements must occur almost immediately after an institution fails.229 The common law D’Oench doctrine
allows the FDIC to quickly evaluate a failed bank’s books and enter

220. The First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.
221. For example, the common law D’Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) saved the FDIC
more than $1 billion from 1993 to 1994. Oversight Hearings, supra note 45, at 161.
222. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1987).
223. Shumadine, supra note 5, at 144 (citing Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv.
Bank for Sav., 932 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1991) (citations omitted)).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See D’Alessandris, supra note 11, at 4.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865-66 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that a purchase and assumption agreement must be “consummated with great speed”).
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into purchase and assumption agreements. Without the doctrine, the
FDIC’s evaluation may take longer as it investigates claims against
the failed bank by borrowers and creditors who aver nonwritten
agreements.
The monetary and efficiency benefits provided by the common law
D’Oench doctrine overcome the unfairness argument. The FDIC must
deal with failed banks under considerable time constraints, without
adequate time to recognize valid nonwritten agreements. The FDIC’s
priorities include the solvency of the insurance fund, bank depositors,
and public confidence in the banking system—not borrowers who enter into nonwritten agreements with financial institutions. The
common law D’Oench doctrine has never produced an unfair outcome
in a case where a borrower brought a written agreement to court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current circuit split seems to stem from each court’s own
opinion as to whether cost or fairness should be the fundamental
consideration when deciding whether Congress abrogated the common law D’Oench doctrine. The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits view
D’Oench’s cost savings and efficiency gains as being more important
than preventing the inequities the doctrine sometimes causes. This is
the correct view because the banking industry relies on a solvent and
strong FDIC to insure it. On the other hand, the D.C., Third, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits assign paramount importance to equity. Abrogating the common law D’Oench doctrine provides one way for those
courts to achieve that equity.
The split will not work itself out. The FDIC, banks, and their borrowers must wait for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue. However, as was the case in Murphy, the FDIC has an incentive to settle:
it ensures the continued viability of the D’Oench doctrine in at least
some jurisdictions. Until the Court resolves the split, the common
law D’Oench doctrine, already long in the tooth, remains viable—
even though it has lost some bite.

